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ADDRESSING DECLINING RIGHTS IN
AN ERA OF DECLINING CRIME
Professor Steiker
We have an extremely distinguished panel with a diversity of
views. In introducing this panel, I should note that one of my
colleagues, who shall remain nameless, sent around a memo to the
rest of the faculty saying that there are two conferences at the law
school this weekend, this conference and the conference of the
Federalist Society. He offered a free lunch to the first faculty
member who could identify the salient difference between the
conferences based on their participants.
Knowing the source of the question, many faculty members got
it right, and the correct answer was that there was a greater
diversity being represented at the Federal Society conference than
here.
But I would like to say in defense of this terrifically organized
conference that the answer is completely untrue at least of this
panel, where we have quite a diversity of views being represented
from some very interesting speakers. So without further ado, I am
going to introduce the panel by going down the line. I will just do
a brief introduction of the four speakers now, so you can know
who you will be hearing from.
Our first speaker will be Professor William Stuntz who is
currently a chaired professor at the University of Virginia Law
School. He is a very eminent scholar in the area of criminal law
and procedure, and we are lucky enough to have him as a member
of the Harvard Law School faculty starting in the fall. He is the
author of wide ranging works on the criminal justice system, and
in particular, on the role of defendants' rights in the criminal justice
system, and he will have some provocative things to say about that.
Professor Stuntz also teaches FBI agents about criminal
procedure at Quantico each year. Thus, he has taught not only
students at the University of Virginia and other students on his
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visits to schools like Yale and Harvard, but he has also taught FBI
agents as well. We are very lucky to have him with us.
After Professor Stuntz, we will hear from Professor Tracey
Maclin from Boston University Law School, also one of the preeminent authorities on criminal justice issues, particularly on the
Fourth Amendment. Professor Maclin has also taught here at
Harvard and at Cornell, among other places. He is not only the
author of a number of widely read and cited books and articles on
the criminal justice system, but he also participates frequently as a
brief writer in important criminal procedure cases that go before
the Supreme Court.
Next, just so that you would not think that this is only a panel
of ivory-towered academics, we have a real lawyer to come and
speak to you. We have a very accomplished criminal defense
lawyer from Washington, D. C., a former colleague of mine from
the Public Defender Service of the District of Columbia ["PDS"].
Robert Wilkins has been with PDS now for ten years, and in
addition to working on hundreds of cases in the criminal justice
system, he is also on the Commission that is working on sentencing
guidelines for the District of Columbia. He is also working on a
new project that I think is very exciting. In addition to being a
public defender, and a very accomplished one, Mr. Wilkins is also
the president of the National African American Museum and
Cultural Complex - a private, non-profit corporation that started
four years ago and incorporated last year with the purpose of
establishing a complex and exhibition space, conference center,
banquet hall, library, genealogy research center, cultural center and
model school in Washington, D. C., to celebrate, preserve and
communicate the record of the experiences of people of African
descent in the United States and throughout the world. It is a very
exciting project, and one that if anyone can bring it to fruition,
Robert Wilkins can.
So this is an incredibly accomplished, exciting, diverse and
interesting group of panelists who will speak to you about
declining rights in an era of declining crimes, and without further
ado, Professor Stuntz will start.

Professor Stuntz

DECLINING RIGHTS

I want to make two claims in my remarks this morning. The
first claim goes to the title of this session, which seems to suggest
that a central problem in the American criminal justice system is
declining rights. I think that's a mistake. I'm not sure that rights are
in fact declining; actually, I think the scope of criminal defendants'
rights is fairly stable. But even if I'm wrong about that, it's not
much of a problem. The truth is, the debates of the last forty years
about criminal defendants' rights, and the doctrinal pull and tug
about how those rights are defined, are vastly less important than
Supreme Court opinions or law review articles or, for that matter,
conferences like this one would suggest.
The second claim I want to make is that there are fundamental
problems with the American criminal justice system - I want to
list four, though alternative lists are certainly possible. But those
fundamental problems have very little to do with defendants' rights,
and very little to do with constitutional law as it's conventionally
understood. For most of the past several decades, we've been
arguing about the wrong thing. The left has argued for more and
stronger rights, the right has argued for fewer and weaker rights,
but both have agreed on the battleground - the battleground has
been rights. It's the wrong battleground.
Let me say a little bit about each of those two points. First, the
claim that the scope of defendants' rights is not that important,
certainly not worth the attention people in my line of work have
devoted to it, and not worth the attention the courts have devoted
to it. Let me give you some examples of what I mean. In the 1970s
and 1980s Fourth Amendment debate was dominated by the
question whether we should have a broad warrant requirement, one
that applied to most searches and seizures, or a narrow one that
applied only to searches of homes. The narrow warrant requirement
won out. Suppose it had been otherwise. How much difference
would that have made? The answer is, very little. If police had to
get warrants more often, states would make it easier to get them,
by having more magistrates and making them more available for
quick telephonic warrants - what we would see is a warrant
process that consists of thirty-second radio or telephone conversations. And magistrates would no doubt approve the overwhelming
majority of applications, as they do now in most jurisdictions.
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Searches and seizures would probably look pretty much the same
as they do now.
Police interrogation is another example. In the run-up to the
Dickerson' decision, a great many people expressed a great deal
of concern over whether the Supreme Court would use that case as
a vehicle for undoing Miranda.2 That concern is hard to understand, since there is no reason to think that Miranda is offering any
meaningful protection to suspects now; doing away with it would
probably change very little. The data on police interrogation show
that suspects who invoke their rights - suspects who call a halt to
questioning, who utter the magic words, "I don't want to talk, I
want to see a lawyer" - virtually always do so before police
questioning even begins; almost no one invokes once questioning
is under way.3 Think about what that means. The theory behind
Miranda is that police will carefully regulate their questioning, will
avoid tactics that are too coercive, in order to avoid having
suspects say, "No more questions - I want to see a lawyer." But
if suspects never say that once questioning begins, there is no
incentive for police to avoid coercive interrogation tactics. In other
words, there is no reason to think Miranda is having any effect on
police questioning. My friend Mike Seidman 4 suggests that
suspects might actually be slightly better off under a voluntariness
standard than under the current set of rules, and Seidman may well
be right.
Another example comes from the law of jury selection. In the
1980s and 1990s defendants won the right to be free from the
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, which makes it harder
for prosecutors to engage in jury-stacking.5 That sounds like a
good thing, and on balance it probably is. But that victory made
jury selection, and hence trials, more costly, and we have a system
in which very, very few cases go to trial as it is - 92 percent of

Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3 See Richard A. Leo, The Impact of Miranda Revisited, 86 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 621, 653 (1996).
4 See Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CALIF. L. REv. 673,
744-46 (1992).
' The leading case is Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
2
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felony convictions nationwide are by guilty plea; the number is
more like 96 or 97 percent in most large cities.6 In a system like
that, jury selection rules are not that important, because trials are
not that important. More to the point, by making trials more
expensive, the law of jury selection has probably made trials even
more rare. That is not a good thing for criminal defendants.
One sees this effect again and again. Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendment rules purport to offer a kind of global protection;
expansions in defendants' rights seem to advance the welfare of
criminal defendants as a whole. The real picture is always different,
and always more complicated. Any new constitutional guarantee
helps some defendants, hurts some, and leaves most about where
they were before. The basic quality of American criminal justice is
not dramatically affected by these rules.
Which leads to my second point. The real cost of our system's
focus on rights is that we miss the criminal justice system's larger
problems. Again, let me offer some examples, four problems the
system faces that have little or nothing to do with the issues that
dominate the law of criminal procedure as it now stands.
The first is funding of indigent criminal defense. We fund
indigent defense at levels that preclude effective representation for
most defendants - and it is most defendants; right now about
eighty percent of defendants receive appointed counsel, and the
figure is higher in most cities.7 That has to be a large part of why
guilty plea rates are so high. Consider this statistic: in the 1980s
and 1990s guilty plea rates rose substantially in large cities, even
while the conviction rate in cases going to trial was falling. That
shouldn't have happened - a falling conviction rate should have
meant more trials, not fewer. The reason we have seen ever more
guilty pleas is because we fund criminal defense at levels that
preclude more than a very small number of trials - and also at
levels that preclude more than a very small amount of pretrial
investigation. And if defense counsel don't have the resources to
6 See William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal

Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L. J. 1, 24 & n.83 (1997), and
sources cited therein.
' See STEvEN K. SMITH & CAROL J. DEFRANCES, INDIGENT DEFENSE 4

(Bureau of Justice Statistics, Selected Findings No. NCJ-158909, Feb. 1996).
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investigate cases and mount a defense, then defendants' rights really
don't matter. And, we should understand, a world with inadequately
funded defense counsel will be a world with a lot of wrongful
convictions, a lot of innocent people behind bars.
A second problem is overbroad criminal law. We criminalize
lots of things police and prosecutors don't wish actually to enforce;
this gives law enforcers a degree of discretion in choosing whom
to go after, and a degree of power once they've decided whom to
go after, that can only be called frightening. We see this problem
most vividly, I think, in the federal system. We have a federal
criminal code with more than three thousand prohibitions; and
those three thousand-plus prohibitions cover an enormous amount
of territory - mail and wire fraud alone, as they're currently
defined, make felons out of a large portion of the adult population.
The result is that U.S. Attorneys' offices are usually able to get just
about anyone they want to get. This may be the most important
thing that's happening in the criminal justice system today, and it's
about criminal law, not criminal procedure - about the scope of
liability rules, not the scope of defendants' rights. In any decent
system, criminal law serves to separate people who've done very
bad things from people who haven't. Our criminal law doesn't do
that separating anymore; it leaves the separating to law enforcers.
A third problem is race. We now have an enormous prison and
jail population -

more than two million people8 -

half of which

black. 9

is
That disproportion is a social disaster. And the disaster
is not the result of violations of Fourth, Fifth, or Sixth Amendment
law, and it isn't the result of equal protection violations either, at
least not according to conventional equal protection standards.
Instead, it's because of things like the way drug markets operate
and the way police tend to attack them, because of the fact that
poor white people tend to be dispersed and poor blacks tend to be
concentrated, which has real implications for how police deal with
those two groups. Tinkering with criminal procedure rules - in the
The two million mark was passed in 1999. Fox Butterfield, Number in
Prison Grows Despite Crime Reduction, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2000, at A10
(citing a Justice Department report).
9 See William J. Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1795,
1795 & n.1 (1998), and sources cited therein.
8
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words of the title of this panel, "addressing declining rights" - is
not going to have any appreciable effect on this problem.
My fourth example is perhaps a little idiosyncratic; it isn't the
subject of much popular or academic discussion, though I think it
ought to be. The problem is the incredible difficulty the system has
in responding to changes in crime. Let me give you some statistics.
In the 1960s serious crime tripled. One would expect the prison
population to increase sharply. Instead, it actually declined continuing a trend from the 1940s and 1950s, when crime was
going down, not up. By the 1980s, the prison population was
skyrocketing, and it has continued to do so throughout the 1990s
- today, we have two million people incarcerated, compared to
1970, when the figure was a little over 300,000.10 But crime is
falling now, and it's falling fairly steeply, suggesting that the prison
population ought to be falling as well. That isn't happening.
To think about what this means, it helps to think about the
price of crime. You can get a good rough measure of the price of
crime by comparing the number of serious felonies - FBI index
crimes (homicide, rape, arson, kidnapping, assault, robbery,
burglary, and auto theft) - with the prison population; those two
figures allow you to calculate the number of days served in prison
per serious felony in any given year. In 1960, we had about 40
days in prison per index crime. By the early 1970s, that number
had fallen to less than 14 days; in 1980 it fell to less than 13 days.
By 1999 the same number was nearly 63 days." In one twentyyear period, the price of serious crime fell by two-thirds. In the
next twenty years, it nearly quintupled.
Those wild swings in the price of crime are the result of a wild
disjunction between what is happening in the world of crime and

10MARGARET

WERNER CAHALAN, HISTORICAL CORRECTIONS STATISTICS

IN THE UNITED STATES, 1850-1984 (Bureau of Justice Statistics 1986).

" These figures are calculated by taking the total incarcerated population in
any given year, multiplying by 365 to get the number of "prisoner days" served
that year, then dividing by the number of FBI index crimes. For the incarcerated
population figures as of 1980 and earlier, I rely on CAHALAN, supra note 10. For
the number of index crimes, I rely on the annual volumes of FBI, Crime in the
United States: Uniform Crime Reports. For the incarcerated population in 1999,
I use the 2,000,000 figure. See Butterfield, supra note 8.
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what is happening in the criminal justice system. Right now, we
are locked into a half-century-old pattern of fighting yesterday's
war. Crime falls in the 1940s; prison populations fall in the 1960s.
Crime skyrockets in the 1960s; prison populations skyrocket in the
1980s and 1990s. Prison populations will probably fall again eventually, the public will get tired of paying to incarcerate
millions of people - but by the time that happens, crime will
probably be rising again, and one lesson of the 1960s is that a
falling prison population probably aggravates a rising crime rate.
This is a truly terrible system if the goal is to control crime at
acceptable social cost, or to decide in some sensible way just how
much criminal punishment we ought to have. And, once again, this
problem has nothing to do with, and is wholly unaffected by,
changes in the scope of defendants' constitutional rights.
There is, I think, a common theme in these four problems. All
four are really problems of institutional design. Legislators'
incentive is to reduce funding for criminal defense and broaden
criminal liability rules. Police departments are structured in a way
that exaggerates the tendency to focus too much attention on poor
urban neighborhoods, and perhaps too little on other sorts of
neighborhoods. And law enforcement bureaucracies are not set up
in ways that allow them to react quickly to changes in crime,
which leads to the wild swings in the prison population we've seen
during the course of my lifetime. We have, over the course of
roughly the past century, designed a criminal justice system that
can only be called pathological. But current constitutional law, with
its relentless focus on defendants' rights, does nothing to address
the pathologies.
None of that is in itself an argument for weakening defendants'
rights; the truth is, some rights probably ought to be strengthened,
some weakened, and some done away with. But this is an argument
for a change in focus. In the past forty years, we have remade the
law of criminal procedure, the law that defines criminal defendants'
rights. In the next forty years, we need to engage in a much, much
harder task. We need to redesign the criminal justice system.
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Professor Steiker
As promised, provocative comments. Thank you very much. I
will now ask Professor Maclin to comment.
Professor Maclin
Thank you. ! am not going to respond to all of Bill's points. He
makes some very good points. He also makes some points that I
disagree with, but I do want to say right from the start that I agree
with him about the incarceration numbers he speaks of, and I
would just like to emphasize, though I am not going to talk about
that, that the incarceration of black defendants is particularly
troubling.
We have in the audience Paul Butler, who has spoken about
this. Professor Butler is a professor at George Washington
University, and as I was reading one of his pieces last night, I was
not shocked, but troubled to read that one in seven blacks between
the age of eighteen and forty is in some form of criminal sanction:
punishment, parole, or prison. If current trends continue, by the
year 2010, ten years from now, a majority of black males will be
in this same situation of prison, parole, or punishment. I just want
to thank Professor Butler for bringing that to my attention. That is
something we should all be concerned with, because as he points
out and others have pointed out, most of the people in prison right
now, most of the black men in prison are not there for violent
offenses. They are there on drug charges, and in my view, they are
no threat to society as a whole. But I just want to say I am not
going to talk about that, although that is very important.
I want to try and maybe give you a little counter to Professor
Stuntz's views. I think rights are important, and I do not think the
problem here is that defendants have too many rights, although I
agree with Professor Stuntz that too little has been done to obtain
resources.
I want to start with a quick comparison of two cases that were
decided last year by the U.S. Supreme Court, 12 one of which you

12

Flippo v. West Virginia, 528 U.S. 11 (1999); Wyoming v. Houghton, 526
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probably have heard about: Wyoming v. Houghton. 3 In that case,
the Supreme Court said that the police can search a person's purse
found inside an automobile, even though there was no specific or
individual probable cause that there were drugs inside the purse.
Justice Scalia said that, if the police have probable cause to search
the whole car, they can search the purse as well, even though there
is no probable cause with respect to that purse itself. 4
The second case did not get much press attention: Flippo v.
West Virginia." In fact, it was a per curiam decision. It basically
involved a 911 report in which the police responded and saw
Reverend Flippo outside of a cabin. He was pretty bruised up and
told the police that his wife was inside, after which the police went
inside and found his wife dead of fatal wounds to the head. They
took Mr. Flippo to a hospital. They then secured the scene. They
came back later and searched a briefcase inside the cabin. Inside
that briefcase were photographs of a man taking off his pants. The
police later discovered that Mr. Flippo and this man were having
a relationship and used these photographs at the trial to suggest that
this relationship had caused actual problems with Mr. Flippo and
his wife, and that may have been one of the reasons why he was
motivated to kill her.
The West Virginia Supreme Court said this was fine. The U. S.
Supreme Court, however, unanimously, in a per curiam decision,
held that such activity was an illegal search, because it was done
without a warrant. The Court reaffirmed that there is no murder
scene exception to the warrant requirement, which was established
in a 1978 case called Mincey v. Arizona.'6 Now certainly there is
nothing novel in these decisions, and you did not come here today
to hear me talk about inconsistencies in the Court's Fourth
Amendment doctrine.
I do want to suggest, however, that the problem here is not so
much the inconsistencies, because if you are aware, as I am sure
many in this room are, of the Court's framework for Fourth
U.S. 295 (1999).
" 526 U.S. 295 (1999).
14

Id. at 305-07.

"5528 U.S. 11 (1999).
16

437 U.S. 385 (1978).
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Amendment cases, these cases are perfectly rational. If contraband
is suspected inside a car, the police can search the car; if contraband is inside a home, even though a homicide occurred and most
people would consider the search of the briefcase in Flippo more
reasonable under the circumstances than the search of Sandra
Houghton's purse, police cannot search the home without a warrant.
I have argued in other places that a reasonableness model is the
wrong way to approach Fourth Amendment cases. Instead of asking
whether or not this is reasonable, which basically involves a
balancing model, which as we all know depends on which side of
the scale the judicial thumb is going to be placed on, I think,
certainly since the 1970s, the thumb has been mostly on the law
enforcement side of the scale, because under a balancing approach,
of course, we ask whether the law enforcement interest is substantial.
Well, when are we going to see a criminal procedure case in
which the law enforcement interest is insubstantial? It rarely
happens. So the thumb is usually placed on the scale of the
prosecution-effective law enforcement side.
However, my point is that instead of having a balancing
approach, what the Court ought to be asking is how we can control
police discretion. In my view the control and distrust of police
discretion is the central purpose of the Fourth Amendment.
The Supreme Court itself, in a case that looked an awful lot
like a Fourth Amendment case, recognized the same point in City
of Chicago v. Morales.'7 That case did get a lot of press attention.
The Court struck down Chicago's anti-gang congregation statute,
and in a rather splintered opinion, six of the Justices agreed that the
Chicago statute gave police too much discretion to enforce the law,
and of course, underneath the concern about police discretion was
the concern that the law would be enforced in an arbitrary and
discriminatory manner.
It seems to me that the same framework that the Court applies
in its vagueness cases should apply when interpreting the Fourth
Amendment. And Morales is not an aberration. There was a case

17 527 U.S. 41 (1999).
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back in the 1980s called Kolender v. Lawson,' 8 in which Justice
O'Connor wrote an opinion holding that a California stop and
identify statute also gave the police too much discretion.
So I think the framework is there in terms of the law. The
problem is that the Court is applying the wrong framework when
it comes to the Fourth Amendment.
Morales was not a unanimous opinion. In fact, Justice Thomas,
in his dissent, argued that what the Chicago statute did was nothing
more than what the Court routinely does in its Fourth Amendment
cases, and that is give the police discretion. I think that Justice
Thomas was both right and wrong, and only in a rare instance will
I say that Justice Thomas was right in the criminal procedure area,
but he was right in that what the Chicago statute did was authorize
the police to do things that the Court routinely authorizes in the
Fourth Amendment context.' 9
I think Thomas was wrong, however, in saying that that was
okay. Instead of having vagueness law shaped by Fourth Amendment law, we should have our Fourth Amendment law at least take
note of and acknowledge the same concerns as the Court raises
when it decides cases dealing with police discretion under the
Fourth Amendment. Put simply, checking police discretion should
be the central inquiry of the Court when deciding Fourth Amendment cases. 20
Now, I want to make three quick points in the time that I have
remaining in light of the subject of today's conference, which is
what will happen in the twenty-first century.
I think the same problems that we saw with respect to individuals' rights in the 1960s and throughout the twentieth century, will
also be here in the twenty-first century. I do not want to say
defendants' rights, because all these individuals that the police
confront, whether they be on the street or in the police station, are
individuals, and they only become defendants once they get
enmeshed in the criminal justice society, or criminal justice system.

8 461 U.S.
19 Morales,
20

352 (1983).
527 U.S. at 109-10 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
See Tracey Maclin, What Can Fourth Amendment Doctrine Learn from

Vagueness Doctrine?, 3 J. CONST. L. 398 (Feb. 2001).
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I want to discuss three issues that I think are particularly
relevant here: police discretion, police perjury, and finally, a
phenomenon that we saw in the 1960s and unfortunately I think we
still see today, which is the notion that police associated particular
black men with crime and with being dangerous.
Regarding police discretion, it was a problem in the 1960s. It
is still a problem today. When the U. S. Supreme Court decides,
for example, whether or not someone should be detained, or
whether or not someone should be frisked, it speaks of a reasonable
suspicion standard, an articulable suspicion.
Yet, if you read a Supreme Court case called Ornelas v. United
States,21 the Court itself says we cannot articulate what this
standard means. We cannot define what reasonable suspicion is. In
fact, it comes from common sense.
Well, what does "common sense" mean? What it means, I
would suggest to you, is that it is not a reasonable suspicion
standard, it is a police suspicion standard. You can see that in the
Court's recent decision in Illinois v. Wardlow,22 in which I filed
a brief, so I am a little biased. I represented the ACLU and the
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. There, the
Court was confronted with the question of whether or not flight
from the police in a high crime neighborhood - and that is all you
have - justifies a detention. I pointed out, and the Solicitor
General also acting as amicus for the other side conceded, that
there was no empirical evidence to support Illinois' claim that
whenever anyone flees from the police, whatever the context, that
is suspicious. I argued to the Court in that case that there is no
empirical data for this, and the Solicitor General conceded that
point. The Chief Justice's opinion for the Court said that neither
empirical data nor scientific certainty is really needed. What is
required in this situation is common sense: we must defer to the
police.23
The problem with this standard is not that all police are bad,
although a lot of them are. The problem is the fact that to the

21 517

U.S. 690 (1996).
528 U.S. 119 (2000).
23 Id. at 124-25.
22
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police any type of flight or evasion is suspicious. For that matter,
refusing to give consent when you are asked to give it and when
the police do not have reasonable suspicion, is suspicious in the
eyes of the police. So what we have now is not a reasonable
suspicion standard because the Court refuses to articulate what
reasonable suspicion might be. The Court has also refused to
articulate what probable cause is as far as legal rules are concerned.
The Court has decided that we do not want legal rules, bright lines,
or guidance in this area. As a result, what we end up with is a
police suspicion standard that, of course, should not be the standard
and is not the standard that the Constitution calls for.
One other case in this area, which was argued this week, is
Florida v. J.L.2 4 The question there is whether the police, based
on an anonymous tip that a black person standing at a bus stop,
wearing a certain type of clothing, supposedly was carrying a
weapon, can stop and frisk that individual and two other persons
found at the scene, if that is all they have.
Some of you may know that in a case called Alabama v.
White,25 the Court held that detentions of individuals would be
permissible on an anonymous tip so long as the tip itself can
predict the future actions of third parties.26
In J.L., however, all we have is three black persons standing on
the street - by the way it was in the middle of the day, I believe
it was in Tallahassee, Florida, and they were not doing anything
illegal. An officer came up to them within a few minutes, told one
individual to put his hands over his head, and frisked him.27
I will submit to you that the Court will uphold this for one
reason: police safety.28 Again, we do not have articulable rules
24
25

26
27

529 U.S. 266 (2000).
496 U.S. 325 (1990).
Id. at 331-32.
529 U.S. at 268-69.

2' This prediction, consonant with the dissenting opinion of the Florida
Supreme Court justices, has proven erroneous. J.L., 529 U.S. at 269, 271-72,
rev'g 727 So. 2d 204, 214-15 (1998) (declining to corroborate the Florida court's
dissenting view that police and public safety created a "firearm exception" to the
general rule barring investigatory stops and frisks on the basis of bare-boned
anonymous tips, the Supreme Court on appeal unanimously ruled that the frisk
in J.L., which resulted from an anonymous tip providing insufficient indicia of
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here. We do not even have articulable suspicion. What we have is
a police suspicion standard. The police allege they need to be able
to frisk in a situation such as that in J.L., not because they can
prove this type of situation is indeed a threat to them, but instead,
because they need to do this based on their own common sense.
With respect to police perjury, recent illustrations are the Abner
Louima case in New York City,29 which I am sure many of you
have heard about, and the recent Los Angeles Police Department
scandal.3" Both these cases bring up the issue of police perjury.
When you read Supreme Court cases in the area of police perjury,
it is as if the Court had been asleep for the last thirty years. The
Court never discusses police perjury at all. It is, however, a
pervasive problem. It was already a pervasive problem when Mapp
v. Ohio31 was decided. The Court acts as if it cannot discuss it.
The only time you will see the issue mentioned in a current
Supreme Court opinion is usually in a dissenting opinion, most
often by Justice Stevens. This is a problem that the Court needs to,
at a minimum, send a signal on. Certainly, state courts and defense
counsel should not be prevented, when they see the same sorts of
police testimony in case after case, from acknowledging that there
is at least a problem in terms of whether we really believe this sort
of police testimony.
A recurring situation is one similar to that in Los Angeles,
where police are now admitting, not only to have planted evidence
reliability, violated the Fourteenth Amendment).
29 See Mike Claffey, Sixth Cop is Guilty in Louima Charges, DAILY NEWS,

June 22, 2000, at 4 (explaining that the trials involved the brutal beating and
sodomy, with a broken broomstick, of Abner Louima, a Haitian immigrant,
outside of a Brooklyn nightclub after a scuffle, by two officers of the New York
Police Department); Alan Feuer, Officer Convicted of Lying, In Last of the
Louima Cases, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2000, at B3 (noting that subsequent perjury
trials resulting in the conviction of several officers in their attempts to cover up
the brutality stem from the fierce impulse of police to protect their own).
30 See Los Angeles Police Department, Executive Summary, Board
ofInquiry
into the Rampart Area Corruption Incident, Intradepartmental Correspondence
from Chief of Police to Board of Police Commissioners (Mar. 1, 2000) at 1-2,
at http://www.lapdonline.org (describing numerous corruption scandals surrounding the L.A.P.D. personnel from 1997 through 1999).
3 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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and lied in their testimony, but to have shot people and placed
weapons on persons. That should draw, I think, the public's
attention, and of course the Supreme Court's attention.
The final issue I want to address is police mistrust in situations
where black persons are defendants, and this of course touches on
the Diallo case.32 It does suggest that some defendants or some
suspects might be better off with fewer rights. I suggest to you that
Mr. Diallo might still be alive if he had had more rights, and that
would be the case if the Court had gone the other way in Terry v.
Ohio.33 I think Terry was wrongly decided from the start in 1968,
even when probable cause had more teeth to it. The problem with
Terry is not that there was reasonable suspicion there, but that a
police suspicion standard was used.
What were the grounds for the police - if we believe their
testimony, because of course that was all we had - for approaching Mr. Diallo? If the police had approached Mr. Diallo and frisked
him, as they typically do in New York City, and found drugs on
him, my guess is that most courts in New York would have upheld
that stop and frisk, because he was acting suspiciously. How do we
know he was acting suspiciously? Well, the police said there was
a black man out at midnight, albeit in front of his own vestibule,
looking up and down the street suspiciously. That is generally
enough to justify a stop and frisk.
The reason why it does not seem to be enough to some people
is because Diallo was shot at forty-one times and hit nineteen
times. I would suggest that the police would not have shot Mr.
Diallo if he had been white. The reason why he was shot is
32 Elizabeth Kolbert, The Perils of Safety: Did Crime-Fighting Tactics Put

Amadou Diallo at Risk?, THE NEW YORKER, Mar. 22, 1999, at 50; see also
William K. Rashbaum, U.S. Says City Has Failed to Release Data on Frisks,

N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 31, 2001, at B4 (noting that Amadou Diallo, an unarmed West
African immigrant, was shot by four plainclothes members of the Street Crime
Unit, who fired forty-one bullets, striking him nineteen times, after mistaking
Diallo's wallet for a gun). All four officers were cleared of criminal charges in
the shooting, but the incident prompted a federal investigation intensely
scrutinizing the aggressive tactics of the unit, previously commended for
sweeping hundreds of guns off the street and winning record crime reductions,
and the department's stop-and-frisk practices generally. Id.
" 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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because the police associate black men with crime, and as the
officers testified, they believed Diallo was dangerous. Why was he
dangerous? Because he was in his own neighborhood? Because he
was out in front of his own house? No, because he was black.
And that is the problem that the Court must confront, not only
with respect to individuals who are eventually charged with a crime
or interrogated in connection to crimes, but even with someone like
Mr. Diallo, who of course committed no crime.
These are the three issues that I think we had back in the
1960s, 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, and unfortunately, I think we will
still have in the twenty-first century. Thank you very much.
Professor Steiker
Thank you, Professor Maclin.
ProfessorSteiker
Thank you. And now, Mr. Robert Wilkins. One thing I
neglected in my introduction is that while Mr. Wilkins is well
known as a Public Defender, one of the things he is probably best
known for is a lawsuit that he and his family brought against the
Maryland State Police, which resulted in an innovative and telling
consent decree. Mr. Wilkins will discuss the origins of that lawsuit
today.
Mr Wilkins
Thank you, Carol. I would like to thank the CR-CL Law
Review for inviting me to speak today. I am an alumnus of the
CR-CL Law Review and love the journal. I am proud to be here
representing the alumni faction of the Law Review and to be a part
of today's event.
I agree with much of what Professor Stuntz said; more than I
anticipated I would before today's symposium began. The key point
that I take issue with is that rights do not matter very much in the
overall system of criminal justice, or that rights do not affect how
many people go to prison or how many cases plea bargain, etc.
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Rights do have some effect on the criminal justice system, but not
as much effect as people think.
However, the scrutiny that the courts place on individual rights
has a tremendous effect on the quality of life of millions of people
on the street and those who interact with police officers on the
street every day.
I am going to tell a little story and integrate into that story why
I think that this is the case - why the enforcement of individual
rights is important to our quality of life. I wish I could say that the
following story is a hypothetical, but unfortunately, it is not.
Indeed, it is a true story, and it happened to me.
On May 8, 1992, I was with my uncle, his wife and his son, as
we were returning from my grandfather's funeral in Chicago. I live
in Washington, D. C. and the rest of my family who lives in the D.
C. area decided to drive with me to Chicago for the funeral. As we
were returning to Washington in a car that my uncle had rented for
the trip, we were stopped by the police.
It was just before dawn on a Monday morning. We had driven
all night from Chicago, as we had stayed much longer than we had
expected. We had actually planned to leave Chicago early Sunday
afternoon so that we could get back to Washington by Sunday
night, but it was a very emotional trip.
My grandmother buried her husband of fifty-eight years and it
was just a time to tarry and take a little bit of extra time with
family, which is why we decided to drive all night. I had to be in
court on Monday morning for a case, and the rest of my family
members had to be back at work on Monday morning, so we were
just trying to get back home in time for the start of the work week.
My cousin was behind the wheel as we were stopped by a
Maryland State Trooper, allegedly for speeding on Interstate 68 in
western Maryland. The trooper stated that he had paced my cousin
going twenty miles over the speed limit, at a speed of sixty miles
per hour in a forty mile per hour speed trap. The trooper asked my
cousin to step out of the car and had him outside the car for a few
minutes, and we sat inside the car trying to figure out what was
going on. Eventually, my uncle and I also stepped out of the car,
and at that time my cousin said: "Daddy, they want to search the
Car."
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I immediately identified myself as a lawyer and a Public
Defender, and I explained to the trooper that I knew what our
rights were, and asked him what was going on. He showed me a
Consent to Search form that he had been attempting to get my
cousin to sign without success.
At that point, I explained to the officer that if he were placing
my cousin under arrest for some reason, he could certainly search
the car incident to the arrest. But other than that, he would need
permission from the group to search the car and we did not want
to give him permission. Alternatively, if he wanted to issue the
driver, my cousin, a ticket, he should proceed to do so and allow
us to be on our way.
The officer's response was: "if you've got nothing to hide, then
what's your problem?" I was quite shocked and explained that the
problem was that we have rights not to be detained, seized and
searched, and we wanted to exercise those rights. The officer stated
that this was a routine procedure, and that nobody ever objected to
it. I responded: "Sir, I can't speak for what other people do or do
not do, but we do not want you to search our belongings, we just
want to be left alone and go on our way." The officer stated:
"Well, if you're not going to sign this form, you are going to have
to wait here until h drug sniffing dog can be brought to the scene."
I explained to the officer that there was a 1985 Supreme Court
case called United States v. Sharpe,34 where the Supreme Court

reaffirmed the Terry standard in traffic stop cases - that you could
not detain people on the side of the road during a traffic stop
unless there was reasonable or articulable suspicion that they had
drugs or were committing some other crime for this kind of
investigatory purpose. 35 The officer's response was that he did not
34' 470 U.S. 675 (1985).

Id. The question presented in this case was "whether an individual
reasonably suspected of engaging in criminal activity may be detained for a
period of 20 minutes." Id. at 676-77. The Court divided this question into two
issues: (1) whether the investigatory traffic stop was based on reasonable
suspicion of drug possession or drug activity; and (2) whether the twenty-minute
detention was reasonable within the scope of the stop. Id. at 682-83. With respect
to the first question, the Court applied the Terry standard, and found that the
record abundantly supported the assumption of the court below that there was a
3
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know anything about the case and that this was just procedure. I
then asked him what his explanation was: why did he think we
were suspicious? What had we done? The officer replied that there
were many problems with rental cars and drugs on the highway. I
then asked him whether that meant he was stopping everyone in a
rental car and asking to search their car just because it is a rental.
He replied: "Well, look, look, look, this is procedure, you know,
are you going to sign the form or not?" I told him that we would
not sign the form. My uncle wanted to determine exactly what the
search meant, because if the search was just going to be something
really quick and not too intrusive, perhaps we would just let the
officer do it, so that we could be on our way.
When we asked the trooper to define the intrusiveness of
search, he said: "look, you know, what I want to do is open up the
trunk, take out your suitcases and look through them here."
Remember that it was raining and we were standing on the side of
the highway.
At that point, my uncle said: "well then you'd better go get
your damn dog." I really did not want a confrontation, nor did I
want to initiate a lawsuit. I just wanted to be able to get home and
beat the morning rush hour traffic into Washington and not be late
for my court appearance. Thus, I asked the trooper if I could open
the car trunk to retrieve my grandfather's funeral program from my
suitcase to justify why we were on the highway at this hour and
prove to him that we were not on a trip to transport drugs. My
hope was that the program would satisfy him, and he would let us
go. The officer responded that he did not want to see any funeral
program and that he wanted to search our car.
At that point, I went back to the car, retrieved a pad and paper,
and started taking down badge numbers, license plate numbers and
everything about the event. A second trooper had joined us by this
time. He did not have a badge, just a nameplate, so I asked for his

reasonable suspicion. Id. at 682. The Court found that "it is not necessary to
decide" the second question because there was no causal relationship between the
detention and discovery of the marijuana by the police. Id. at 683. Then, the
Court rephrased the issue of the case as "whether it was reasonable under the
circumstances facing [the police] to detain [the petitioner], whose vehicle
contained the challenged evidence, for approximately 20 minutes." Id.
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badge number. He said: "aw, you do not need it. 'Syracuse,' make
sure you spell it right, I am the only Syracuse in the State Police."
It was all a big joke to the police officers, who implied that there
was not much we were going to be able to do with pen and paper.
I want to stop for a moment and explain the implications of this
incident as I think about individual rights and their lax enforcement
by the Supreme Court and lower courts.
Was this reasonable or articulable suspicion? And what does
this incident say about rights when you have a situation where
police officers know that they are dealing with a lawyer who cites
a Supreme Court case to them and is taking down notes and they
have absolutely no fear of scrutiny regarding their actions? What
does this incident say about the effectiveness of our civil justice
system or the exclusionary rule in dealing with enforcing the rights
that we are supposed to have and that are guaranteed by the
Constitution?
After we filed the lawsuit, we learned that the trooper, Brian
Hughes, was actually following procedure, because a document, a
"criminal intelligence report," had been distributed about two
weeks before we were stopped.3 6 The document states that there
was a crack cocaine problem in the area, and the people who were
transporting the drugs were predominantly male and female black
traffickers. The document went on to state that these traffickers like
to use rental cars, particularly from the D. C. area with Virginia
registration, and travel early in the morning or late at night. The
report also carried the ominous warning "Caution: Several of these
people are armed and dangerous and have commented that they'll
shoot a police officer if necessary. Be careful, because they will
hide, they're often armed and they will hide guns in different
places, etc."3 7 We were black, coming from the Washington, D.C.

area, in a rental car with Virginia registration, and traveling early
in the morning. Therefore, we fit the profile, and I guess the
trooper was telling the truth when he said that he was just
following procedure.

36

Criminal Intelligence Report, State of Maryland, Maryland State Police

(Apr. 27, 1992) (on file with the Journal of Law and Policy).
17 See id.
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Let us stop here and talk about a couple of issues. First, this
profiling document sets the stage for potentially dangerous
confrontations because it encourages troopers to stop black people,
and then warns them that they are generally considered to be armed
and dangerous. In such a climate, it is no wonder that incidents like
the Amadou Diallo shooting occur.

What about consent? I could not believe that my cousin, who
was by himself outside of the car, withstood the barrage of
questioning and suspicion by saying no to this trooper when he was
outside alone. And then, when my uncle and I joined the discussion, as much as we did not want to, we came close to giving our
consent. It was only because we understood that the scope of the
search was going to be so intrusive and so unreasonable as to
invade our privacy rights, that we did not give up our rights to
consent, as much as we wanted to hold on to them.
That raises the question whether any court would have held that
our consent was involuntary if we had given it under those facts.
I do not believe so. Is there a problem with that? Is the involuntariness standard too high to judge fairly these situations? Additionally,
what about the fact that the officer suggested that if we had
nothing to hide, then we should not have a problem with being
searched? What does such a accusation say about whether the
decisions of the Supreme Court and lower courts are correct when
they hold that there is no obligation on behalf of the police to
advise citizens that they have a right not to consent? 39 Such
38 See generally Kolbert, supra note 32, at 50; see also Rashbaum, supra

note 32, at B4 (noting that Amadou Diallo, an unarmed West African immigrant,
was shot by four plainclothes members of the Street Crime Unit, who fired fortyone bullets, striking him nineteen times, after mistaking Diallo's wallet for a
gun). All four officers were cleared of criminal charges in the shooting, but the
incident prompted a federal investigation intensely scrutinizing the aggressive
tactics of the unit, previously commended for sweeping hundreds of guns off the
street and winning record crime reductions, and the department's stop-and-frisk
practices generally. Rashbaum, supra note 32, at B4.
'9See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 231-32 (1973)
(holding that though consent must be voluntary in order to be constitutionally
valid, the police's failure to inform the subject of search of his or her right to
refuse consent does not necessarily render the search invalid because such
requirement "has been almost universally repudiated by both federal and state
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decisions create a situation where law enforcement officers fail to
advise people of their right to refuse consent, in an environment
where the police affirmatively tell people who want to assert their
rights that they are suspicious or doing something wrong.
In a moment I am going to show you the actual report that the
trooper wrote after he learned that we were going to file a lawsuit.
The officer lied in the report and said that he informed us of our
right not to sign the consent form. The abstract problem of police
perjury is infuriating enough by itself. It is even more frustrating,
though, when it happens to you and you see how officers lie about
events in reports, and you wonder whether your credibility is going
to be able to prevail over the police officer's credibility to allow a
favorable result in your case.
Returning to the story, after waiting for the search dog to
arrive, which took about half an hour, we were told that we had to
exit the car and stand along the side of the road in the rain while
the German shepherd jumped on top of the car so it could smell
the area around the windshield wipers, trunk, headlights, tail lights,
hub caps, and the area where the window recedes down into the
door panel. Essentially, every inch of the exterior of the car would
be inspected by the dog. It took about two to three minutes for the
handler to walk the dog completely around the car and over every
inch of the exterior surface.
All this time, we were standing in the rain, and by then three
or four police cars were parked nearby with their lights flashing.
People were driving past and slowing down, looking at the flashing
lights, the police officers, the German shepherd, and at us, and
clearly concluding that we must have done something wrong. I
truly felt that everyone driving past must have been thinking that
the police had apprehended some more criminals.
I distinctly remember one particular car driving past very
slowly. There were two young white children, a boy and a girl, in
the car attempting to view the scene, with their noses pressed up
against the window and their eyes focused on me. I stood there
wondering what they were thinking. What message, what kind of
miseducation did they get about me because of this incident? I
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have never even smoked a joint or taken any kind of drugs in my
life, and although I have done many things that I am not proud of,
for various reasons, I have never had any interest in taking drugs.
There are Presidents of the United States and members of Congress
who cannot make that claim, yet I was standing on the side of the
road in the rain like a suspect.
When the Supreme Court looks at these issues, it concludes that
these detentions, searches and frisks are minimal intrusions when
balancing the interests of public safety and law enforcement.4" Yet
these detentions, frisks and seizures, particularly when they are
unjustified and unreasonable, really have a serious detrimental
impact on the quality of life of African Americans and other
minority groups, a large segment of our population.
I believe that "real world perspective" is missing in today's
jurisprudence. I went to the arguments of Maryland v. Wilson,4'

the case that held ultimately that it was okay to order passengers
out of a car during a routine stop, even where there was no
suspicion of those passengers,42 and I really felt as if I were an
outsider looking in, even though I watched as a member of the
Supreme Court bar. The Court was talking about the issues, but it

4 See, e.g., Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990)
(upholding the brief and easily avoidable detention, for purposes of observing
signs of intoxication, of all motorists approaching a roadblock); see also United
States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) (discussing various U.S. Supreme Court
cases holding that brief detention of persons during the police search of cars is
constitutional); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (upholding
brief interrogative stops of all motorists crossing certain border checkpoint as
reasonable without individualized suspicion).
41 519
42

U.S. 408 (1997).

Id. at 414-15. In this case, after lawfully stopping a car speeding above

the legal limit, a police officer ordered the passenger out of the car because he
noticed that both the driver and the passenger appeared to be "extremely
nervous." The passenger was arrested and charged with possession of cocaine
and intent to distribute when a quantity of cocaine fell to the ground upon his
exiting the car. Id. at 410-11. The majority relied on the "public v. private
interest" balancing test approach. Id. at 411-15. The dissent, however, emphasized that the level of suspicion based on the police officer's observation of the
passenger's nervousness did not amount to anywhere close to that of "reasonable
suspicion" standard established in Terry v. Ohio. Id. at 415-18 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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was not talking about me, and the Court did not seem to know
anything about what it was like for me to stand outside during our
Maryland traffic stop.
Frisks involve police officers feeling and touching the private
parts of citizens. Police officers are inspecting your groin area
when they frisk you. They are groping women's breasts and
everything else while frisking them. And sometimes, the police
want you to be lying spread-eagled, face down on the wet, dirty
ground when they frisk you. You are often handcuffed during these
and quite often guns are pointed at you.
Yet, I do not think that these aspects of an individual's dignity
and quality of life are deemed of any real importance in most court
decisions. The Supreme Court and lower courts routinely dismiss
arguments seeking more scrutiny of the police because these
encounters are simply temporary, momentary, minimally intrusive
actions.
We were able to get a favorable settlement in our lawsuit. I had
access to the courts, unlike most people. I was the perfect client for
a lawyer wanting to bring a case: a Harvard Law School graduate,
I had cited the Supreme Court case that was on point to the trooper
during the detention. We had good facts, good case law, and there
were no arrests or convictions on my record. We also had a
"smoking gun," a written profile that illegally targeted blacks for
drug searches that we could link to the trooper's explanation that
he was searching us "because of problems with rental cars and
drugs on the highway. 4 3 Thus, we were able to get a favorable
settlement that required the police to adopt a non-discrimination
policy, to retrain every single one of their troopers, but most
importantly to document every search. They have to document
every time they search someone based on consent or a drug
sniffing dog, and they have to document the race of each person
searched and the reasons for performing the search. They also have
to give that information to the ACLU and the federal judge
monitoring the case on a quarterly basis.
The scary thing about this case is what we learned from that
documentation. We saw that especially on 1-95, there was a huge

" See Criminal Intelligence Report, supra note 36, at 1.
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disparity in blacks and whites who were being searched. About
seventy to seventy-five percent of the persons being searched were
African Americans, but we found that only seventeen percent of the
drivers and seventeen percent of the traffic violators on 1-95 were
African American. So, how do you go from seventeen percent to
seventy-five percent? 4 We learned from the Maryland State
Police's own data that if you searched one hundred whites and one
hundred blacks on 1-95, you found drugs the same number of
times. 45 Most people were innocent and had no drugs or contraband, but the percentage of people who had drugs was the same,
exactly, among blacks and whites. The problem was that for every
hundred whites who were searched, 400 or 500 blacks were
searched, which resulted in this disparity if you looked at the arrest
statistics or the statistics of those who had drugs.4 6 Without the

data from our lawsuit, all you would have known from the
Maryland State Police was that seventy-five percent of people
arrested were African Americans and that African Americans were
seventy-five percent of the people who had drugs. But with our
data you could go behind those numbers to see that the disparity
was completely accounted for by the use of police discretion to
search African Americans at a much higher rate.
Obviously, that was not what we were hoping for with the
settlement. Thus, we are now back in court to try and institute
further sanctions such as installing video cameras in the police cars
and taking other measures to deal with and hopefully eradicate this
problem.
But even with all of these facts, it is still difficult to prove a
Fourteenth Amendment violation. We have a system that generally
provides that if you cannot prove intentional discrimination, you
will have difficulty proving an equal protection violation. We had
a statistician look at this disparity of searches in Maryland, and he
concluded that there was only a one in a quintillion chance that the
disparity could be described by coincidence - and a quintillion is

44DEBORAH RAMIREZ ET AL., A RESOURCE GUIDE ON RACIAL PROFILING
DATA COLLECTION SYSTEMS: PROMISING PRACTICES AND LESSONS LEARNED,

6-7 (Nov. 2000), at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffilesl/bja/184768.pdf.
41 See id. at 10.
46

See id. at 7.
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one with eighteen zeroes behind it.47 Despite the statistics, the
State of Maryland made a very spirited argument and we did not
prove a Fourteenth Amendment violation because statistical
disparity alone is not sufficient. In the court's view, we had to
prove that the cause of the particular searches of African Americans was intentional discrimination and we did not do so, because
we did not have another smoking gun.
I think that my experience of being searched, dealing with the
courts, achieving a landmark settlement and then seeing how
difficult it is to enforce the settlement, helped move me towards the
project of creating a national museum dedicated to African
American history. I, quite frankly, have almost given up hope that
the lower courts, the Supreme Court and the legal system generally
will have any real commitment or any real capacity under the
current political culture in this country to deal with these problems,
and I have turned my attention elsewhere.
I think that is a sad state of affairs, because if such frustration
can happen to me, someone with my opportunities, in my position
and my education, having attended Harvard Law School, what do
you think the average young black male living in a poor, urban
area experiencing the same frustration thinks about the system? Do
you think that he believes that he should respect that system or the
people who, to him, represent that system?
I leave you with those thoughts and thank you very much.
Professor Steiker
Thank you very much. We have only about ten to fifteen
minutes left, so instead of asking members of the panel to respond
to one another, I would like to open it up to the audience to ask a
question of a particular panel member or the panel generally. We
have had quite a variety of points of view and ideas. Any comments or questions? Great, come to the microphone.
Audience Member

47 See Report of John Lamberth, Ph.D., ACLU SUPREME COURT WATCH,

at http://www.aclu.org/court/lamberth.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2001).
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My name is John Snyder. I am a first-year law student here.
Just having heard these stories and knowing the powers of a
prosecutor, it seems to me that people seeking to reform the system
and to make it respect the rights of the defendants might be more
drawn to being prosecutors. By being prosecutors, they can have
the power, if there is police abuse, to ensure that suspects arrested
as a result of police misconduct are not prosecuted, and they can
take a look at police testimony or police perjury more closely and
very carefully.
On hearing Mr. Wilkins' story, if I were a prosecutor, I would
be very ashamed of the police. And I am wondering whether there
is any organization of prosecutors who are concerned with this
problem and are taking an active role working with people who are
interested in reforming the system. And that question is for anyone
who is interested in answering it. I also see what is happening with
the Los Angeles Police Department, and this has been going on for
years. We are talking about four convictions that have been
overturned so far. Were the police officers so ingenuous that they
were able to pull the wool over the prosecutors' eyes, or was it that
the prosecutors were not careful and did not scrutinize enough?
ProfessorStuntz
Can I make a comment? Part of the problem is that prosecutors
are enormously powerful, and though it is true that if you want to
do something to make some pretty important comer of the world
a little better, there are few better options than to prosecute with
the kind of training that you guys are getting, what I think is not
true is the misperception of how the organization chart works, that
police officers are subordinates of prosecutors. The relationship is
not superior to subordinates. It is much more complicated than that.
I think this is a difference between our legal system and the
legal system of some other developed countries, and it is a very,
very important one. It is one of the most important features that
may also be one of the worst features of the system. Basically,
police departments do not have any other entity in the legal system
over and above them. They are autonomous. The politicians are
over them in places where police chiefs are in some measure
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politically accountable. In Los Angeles, no one was over and above
them because that was a large part of what has gone wrong in Los
Angeles.
Los Angeles has a tradition of police departments where the
police department is essentially a civil service entity. It is not
subject to local political control. It is not subject to the control of
the local prosecutor's office. It is not really subject to anybody's
control. It was subject to Darryl Gates' control48 for a long time,
and that is really what produced the current situation in Los
Angeles.
I think one of the best things we could do for the system is to
try and restructure the relationships between various institutions in
the system so that something or someone is over and above police
departments. I think that would also be effective in curbing the
kind of abuses that Mr. Wilkins was talking about.
Audience Member
I would like to ask Professor Stuntz about his skeptical attitude
towards rights or their effectiveness. Isn't the problem the way
rights are defined now? I mean the problems you have identified
are absolutely the most important problems. But can't those
problems be solved if we define the rights differently?
I will just give two examples. One is the problem of indigent
defense. So, if the courts will define assistance of counsel differently than now, would we not approve as ineffective assistance of
counsel, for example, defense attorneys who have impossible case
loads or defense attorneys who fall asleep in court? Second, with
48

See History of the LAPD, at http://www.lapdonline.org/ (last visited Feb.

6, 2001) (explaining that Daryl F. Gates served as Chief of Police in the Los
Angeles Police Department from March 28, 1978 to June 27, 1992). Gates was
well regarded for his aggressive anti-narcotics campaign that resulted in his
creation of the Drug Abuse Resistance Education and Special Weapons and
Tactics teams programs. Id. However, Gates received wide criticism for his
protection of the police department in the Rodney King incident and, in the wake
of the federal investigation of police corruption following the Rodney King riots,
he surrendered his post to Willie L. Williams, the first black Chief of Police of
the Los Angeles Police Department. Seth Mydans, Era in Los Angeles Ends as

Chief Quits, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1992, at 6.
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regard to the problem of race, if we define or the Court defines
equal protection challenges differently, or at least the discovery
issue differently than it did in United States v. Armstrong,49
wouldn't that make a change?
Professor Stuntz
I guess the short answer is sure, and we would have very
different kinds of rights than the ones we have now. You're
absolutely right. What I am trying to suggest is that rights the way
that we traditionally think of them are a lot less important than I
think we tend to think.
Look, a good way to capture this issue might be in the
following manner. If you divide criminal procedure into two, think
about the policing sphere and the adjudication sphere. In the
policing sphere, the central idea of rights, the way that we have
developed them, is some sort of zone of privacy or autonomy that
neither the government nor the police can penetrate without
sufficient reason. What rights do not mean in that sphere is
protection against improper selection. That is, against misuse of the
kind of discretion that substantive criminal law gives police
officers.
My argument would be that this second part is the larger
problem. I do not mean the first problem is not a significant
problem, but that is the much larger problem.
In the adjudication sphere, what do rights mean? Rights
typically mean procedural hoops that the government gives
defendants if defendants choose to avail themselves of them. What
rights do not mean is resources to make use of those procedural
hoops. Once again, that is the larger problem.
Defendants would be, I think, much better off with fewer
procedural hoops and more resources. That's all.

49 517 U.S. 456, 463 (1996) (holding that "Rule 16(a)(1)(C) [of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure] authorizes defendants to examine Government
documents material to the preparation of their defense against the Government's
case in chief, but not to the preparation of selective-prosecution claims").
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Of course, you could reconfigure the law to emphasize those
things that are now de-emphasized, and I would not be making the
argument that I am making.
Professor Maclin
Bill Stuntz rightly suggests that the substantive criminal law is
too wide or at least that is implied. I agree with him there, but that
to me is not an argument that we should reduce rights, or that
defendants have too many rights.
To me, a rights-based regime, and that is what we have under
the Constitution by the way, can certainly co-exist with a criminal
justice system. Bill is certainly right when he talks about the
resources, if you even get to a trial, because as we all know most
defendants plea bargain out. But I do not see any inconsistency
with a strong rights-based regime and more resources.
Now, Bill might say that there is a limited pie. We only have
a certain amount of resources, so you have to choose where you
want to go. But I do not see an inherent conflict between a strong
rights-based regime, which I do not think we really have, and a
regime that says that defense counsel who have more than 150
cases, more than what the ABA recommends for criminal defense,
cannot be effective.
So I think your question, the gentleman's question is a fair
question, but I do not think it has to be an either/or choice.
Professor Steiker
Let me take one more question. Yes.
Audience Member
I am a second-year law student here. My question is one of
practical implementation. I have an intuition that all of us have an
understanding that there are certain procedural abuses. So, to a
certain extent, we are preaching to the choir. Has any of the
panelists given a thought to how we can transform this intuition
that is held within this group here into the broader public consciousness?
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ProfessorMaclin

Obviously, I disagree slightly with the premise of the question
if the premise is that the broad public wants to hear what I am
saying, because what I am saying is very different from what Bill
has said. The public does not want to hear about restricting the
police, and certainly the public does not want to hear what Bill is
saying. What I agree with him on is restricting the substantive
criminal law.
We have seen, for example, Bill Clinton. Bill Clinton has been
successful because he has basically run as a Republican when it
comes to criminal justice matters, and he has been very popular in
that.
So I am not so sure the public wants to hear this, or if it were
to hear this, it would respond in a way that you or I might respond.
Professor Stuntz
I would say two things. One is about the development of public
opinion and the other is about the police.
Regarding public opinion, the picture may be a little more
positive than is being painted here. There are natural cycles, natural
tendencies that work in these things, and those cycles sometimes
take a long time. It takes a long time for the pendulum to swing,
but these pendulums do swing. You see a kind of public response,
a public conversation about racial profiling and incidents like the
one that you heard about, that we all heard about a few minutes
ago, that is substantially different and substantially more sympathetic than anything you would have heard five or ten years ago.
Those things were going on five or ten years ago.
Public opinion has moved, and is still moving. I think one of
the reasons public opinion is moving on the sides of the prison
population is just because of the sheer expense of the prison
population.
Finally, I think that the independent counsel statute has been a
gift for criminal justice in highlighting prosecutorial overreaching.
These are salient examples of prosecutorial overreaching, and the
public responds in ways that I think over time will cause some
reining in of prosecutorial overreaching by other prosecutors.
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With respect to the police, I think the only source of change,
the only change that is going to be really and truly productive, is
not going to be changes in Fourth Amendment or Fifth Amendment
law. It is going to be changes in police cultures. I have a slightly
more depressing message regarding the police culture. I am not
sure how you can change the police culture. I think that would be
very, very difficult. I think the truth of the matter is that police
departments are like good schools or bad schools.
At least in my experience with my own children, as you get to
know the principal, you have just gotten to know the school. Good
principals produce healthy cultures, which in turn produce good
schools. Good police chiefs produce healthy cultures, which in turn
produce good departments. How you get the right sort of police
chiefs in place - that is hard. I think that is the challenge.
Professor Steiker
Thank you all very much for a very interesting discussion.

